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“EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING” 
CIRCUMSTANCES:  
REVISITING THE ROLE OF  
COMPASSIONATE RELEASE  
IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
IN THE WAKE OF THE FIRST STEP ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, Steve Cheatham was serving his prison sentence for three bank 
robberies.1 That fall, Steve was diagnosed with advanced-stage cancer.2 
Steve petitioned the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) for compassionate release, 
a reduction in sentence available to terminally ill prisoners.3 In practice, the 
BOP has denied or delayed the vast majority of such petitions: between 
2013 and 2017, the BOP granted only six percent.4 Steve’s wife, Marie, 
closely followed the progress of federal criminal justice reform, hoping that 
new legislation could provide a mechanism for Steve’s release.5 At the end 
of 2018, a criminal justice reform bill did pass. The new law allowed Steve 
to bring his petition for compassionate release directly to a judge, rather than 
proceeding through the BOP’s administrative process. The next day, the 
judge signed the order to allow Steve to return home.6 But Marie’s joy was 
short lived—Steve died later the same afternoon in a prison hospice 
facility.7 
Compassionate release is a “safety valve” in the criminal justice system 
that allows for the release of prisoners in “extraordinary and compelling” 
circumstances.8 As Steve’s story illustrates, though, bureaucratic delays and 
unwarranted denials by the BOP have caused qualifying prisoners to die 
behind bars.9 These failures affect the oldest and frailest people in the prison 
 
1. Mitch Smith, A New Law Made Him a ‘Free Man on Paper,’ but He Died Behind Bars, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/criminal-justice-reform-steve-cheatha 
m.html [https://perma.cc/4DFR-MFTQ]. 
2. Id.  
3. Id. 
4. Christie Thompson, Frail, Old and Dying, but Their Only Way Out of Prison Is a Coffin, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/us/prisons-compassionate-release-.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/5TDY-F5JA]. 
5. Smith, supra note 1. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Mary Price, The Other Safety Valve: Sentence Reduction Motions Under 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(1)(A), 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 188, 188 (2000). 
9. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PUB. NO. I-2013-006, THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF PRISONS’ COMPASSIONATE RELEASE PROGRAM i (2013) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GEN.].  











system,10 a population segment that is rising as a consequence of mass 
incarceration.11 Harsh sentencing laws with mandatory minimums, arising 
out of “tough on crime” and “war on drugs” policies of the 1980s, have led 
to the increasing warehousing of aging prisoners.12 Currently, the number 
of federal inmates exceeds 150,000.13 Of those inmates, over 9,000 are over 
sixty years old.14 These inmates are especially likely to be eligible for 
compassionate release, some due to age alone, and others due to age-related 
infirmities.15 As the average age of prisoners increases, so do the costs of 
incarceration.16 Failures in compassionate release raise both humanitarian 
and fiscal concerns as federal prisons increasingly incarcerate ailing, elderly 
inmates who do not pose a risk to public safety.17 
Lawmakers have recently revitalized compassionate release as part of a 
larger effort to address mass incarceration, through the First Step Act of 
2018.18 Previously, the BOP served a gatekeeping role for all compassionate 
 
10. Christie Thompson, Old, Sick and Dying in Shackles, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 7, 
2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/03/07/old-sick-and-dying-in-shackles [https://perma.c 
c/6SCN-8629]. 
11. Much has been written about the failures of criminal justice reform and about the 
phenomenon of mass incarceration. See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Long-Term Sentences: Time to Reconsider 
the Scale of Punishment, 87 UMKC L. REV. 113, 113 (2018) (“In recent years, there has been a growing 
bipartisan consensus that the uniquely American policy of mass incarceration is both fiscally and morally 
unsustainable.”); EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN 
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2019). By its design, compassionate release is a strictly 
limited form of relief available only to inmates in exceptional circumstances. As such, the mechanism 
cannot curb the penological crisis arising out of mass incarceration.  
12. ACLU, AT AMERICA’S EXPENSE: THE MASS INCARCERATION OF THE ELDERLY ii (2012), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/elderlyprisonreport201206131.pdf; Hope 
Reese, What Should We Do About Our Aging Prison Population?, JSTOR DAILY (July 17, 2019), https:// 
daily.jstor.org/what-should-we-do-about-our-aging-prison-population/ [https://perma.cc/6SCN-8629].  
13. Population Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (last updated Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.bo 
p.gov/mobile/about/population_statistics.jsp [https://perma.cc/KA5F-UZAE]. 
14. Inmate Statistics: Inmate Age, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (last updated Feb. 20, 2021), https:// 
www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_age.jsp [https://perma.cc/QT3E-DTCT]. 
15. Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, Quelling the Silver Tsunami: Compassionate Release of Elderly 
Offenders, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 937, 941 (2018). 
16. Chris Feliciano Arnold, The Dying American Prisoner, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 23, 2019), https 
://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/12/compassionate-release-lets-prisoners-die-free/60398 
8/ [https://perma.cc/2LXD-7RK7]. In 2016, the Bureau of Prisons spent $1.3 billion for the provision of 
inmate health care. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-379, BUREAU OF PRISONS: BETTER 
PLANNING AND EVALUATION NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND AND CONTROL RISING INMATE HEALTH CARE 
COSTS 15 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685544.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRN3-KLSV]; 
William W. Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-Examination of the Justifications for 
Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850, 885 (2009). 
17. Compassionate release can be justified by weighing the benefit to the state in reducing a 
prisoner’s sentence against the penological benefits foregone by not enforcing the full sentence, 
including proportionality, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence. Berry, supra note 9, at 882. 
Compassionate release provides cost savings for the BOP, assists with prison population management, 
and additionally actually results in lower recidivism than for inmates with no reduced sentences. 
INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 9, at iii–iv; see also Thompson, supra note 10 (describing bipartisan support 
for compassionate release as a way to reduce the federal prison population and save taxpayer money). 












release petitions.19 Now inmates may bring their petitions directly to 
sentencing courts after exhausting the administrative remedies available 
through the BOP.20 This change has increased the number of inmates who 
benefit from compassionate release.21 Notably, however, this change has 
also led to adversarial litigation of compassionate release petitions.22  
This Note considers the constitutional implications and policy concerns 
arising from the updated compassionate release mechanism. Part I of this 
Note traces the statutory development of compassionate release in the 
federal prison system. Part II examines the place of compassionate release 
within the federal constitutional scheme. Part III turns to the policy concerns 
surrounding representation by appointed counsel of compassionate release 
petitioners. Finally, Part IV proposes expanding the guiding definitional 
boundaries of compassionate release and concludes by arguing for an 
independent body in the executive branch to handle administrative 
compassionate release petitions. 
I. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 
In the 1980s, lawmakers responded to public calls for a tougher stance 
on crime through a series of criminal justice reforms.23 The Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984 included a major overhaul of federal sentencing 
through its constituent part, the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”).24 The 
SRA’s purpose was to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparity25 and to 
create “certain and effective sentencing.”26 To this end, the SRA instituted 
determinate sentencing through sentencing guidelines, abolished parole, 
and authorized the creation of the Sentencing Commission.27 The 
Sentencing Commission’s sentencing guidelines constrained judicial 
 
19. Bryant S. Green, As the Pendulum Swings: The Reformation of Compassionate Release to 
Accommodate Changing Perceptions of Corrections, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 123, 125 (2014). 
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
21. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Announces the Release of 3,100 Inmates 
Under First Step Act, Publishes Risk and Needs Assessment System (July 19, 2019), https://www.justice 
.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-release-3100-inmates-under-first-step-act-publishes-risk-an 
d [https://perma.cc/A699-MQDG]. 
22. See discussion infra Part III. 
23. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Clemency, Parole, Good-Time Credits, and Crowded Prisons: 
Reconsidering Early Release, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2013) [hereinafter Larkin, Reconsidering 
Early Release]. 
24. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
25. Robert Howell, Sentencing Reform Lessons: From the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to the 
Feeney Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1069, 1073 (2004). 
26. Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing 
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing 
System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 188 (1993). 
27. Howell, supra note 25, at 1073–74.  











discretion in order to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparity.28 In practice, 
these reforms increased the average length of imposed sentences and 
increased the federal prison population.29 Overall, since the SRA, the trend 
in the criminal justice system has been to send an increasing number of 
offenders to prisons while, concurrently, returning a decreasing number of 
inmates to society through early release mechanisms.  
To counteract the increased rigidity in the criminal justice system under 
the SRA,30 lawmakers inserted two exceptions under which sentencing 
courts can modify terms of imprisonment.31 Both exceptions require the 
court to consider the sentencing factors set forth in section 3553(a),32 and 
only allow a reduction if it is consistent with “applicable policy statements” 
by the Sentencing Commission.33 One exception applies only to inmates 
whose sentences were based on a sentencing range that was subsequently 
lowered by the Sentencing Commission.34 Under this exception, the 
sentencing court may reduce the term of imprisonment upon motion of the 
Director of the BOP, upon its own motion, or upon the motion of the 
defendant.35  
In contrast, the other exception—the compassionate release 
mechanism—applies to all inmates. Through this “safety valve,”36 
sentencing courts can reduce an inmate’s term of imprisonment if 
“extraordinary and compelling” circumstances warrant such a reduction.37 
Compassionate release does not depend on good behavior in prison or 
rehabilitation; instead, the mechanism allows sentencing judges to consider 
a prisoner’s complete circumstances and to determine whether such 
circumstances warrant a reduction in sentence. When originally created, the 
 
28. Id. at 1074. 
29. Criminal Justice Facts, THE SENTENCING PROJECT https://www.sentencingproject.org/crimi 
nal-justice-facts/ [https://perma.cc/TGN2-63VS]. 
30. Howell, supra note 25, at 1070.  
31. Price, supra note 8, at 188 (“While one of Congress’s goals was to ensure the finality of 
sentences, Congress also recognized that sometimes other considerations are important enough to 
warrant changing a sentence that has otherwise become final.”). 
32. Such factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and 
characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense and to protect the public. 18 U.S.C. § 3553.  
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The statute also authorizes the court to modify a term of 
imprisonment if expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). Rule 35 authorizes the court, on motion of the government, to reduce the 
sentence to reflect substantial assistance provided to the government after the defendant’s sentence 
became final. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b)(1). 
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 
35. Id.  
36. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 121 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3304. 
37. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 994(s), 98 Stat. 1987, 2023; Price, 












sentencing courts could review compassionate release petitions only upon 
motion of the BOP.38  
Because lawmakers intended compassionate release to introduce 
flexibility into an otherwise rigid sentencing scheme, the standard—
“extraordinary and compelling”—is broadly phrased and subject to variable 
interpretations. The Sentencing Commission’s policy guidelines provide 
guidance to sentencing courts. The Sentencing Commission has articulated 
a variety of qualifying circumstances, including the inmate’s medical 
condition, age, family circumstances, and any other extraordinary or 
compelling circumstances.39 
Due to the BOP’s gatekeeping role for compassionate release,40 
however, the BOP’s interpretation of the “extraordinary and compelling” 
standard controlled which compassionate release petitions came before 
sentencing courts. The BOP used a narrower interpretation of the 
compassionate release standard than is authorized by the broad statutory 
language, and, indeed, a narrower standard than that articulated by the 
Sentencing Commission’s policy statement.41 The BOP effectively 
restricted the use of the compassionate release mechanism to prisoners who 
were terminally ill.42 This approach eschewed many of the categories of 
prisoners whose particular circumstances otherwise qualified for 
compassionate release, as defined by the Sentencing Commission.43  
The BOP’s narrow interpretation, as well as bureaucratic deficiencies, 
resulted in few compassionate release petitions coming before sentencing 
courts.44 A Human Rights Watch report found that the BOP filed an 
 
38. § 3582(c)(1)(A), 98 Stat. at 1998–99. 
39. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
Qualifying circumstances fall under four categories. First, the medical condition of the prisoner, 
including terminal illness, other serious medical conditions, impairment, or mental or physical 
deterioration due to aging that impairs the prisoner’s ability to function. Second, when the prisoner is at 
least sixty-five years old, is experiencing deterioration due to aging, and has served either at least ten 
years or seventy-five percent of the term of imprisonment. Third, family circumstances such as death or 
incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor children or of the prisoner’s spouse. Fourth, any 
other circumstances that are “extraordinary and compelling.” Id. 
40. Courts regularly found that the BOP had no legal duty to bring a motion for an inmate’s 
compassionate release. Green, supra note 19, at 142. 
41. The Sentencing Commission actually expanded its guidelines for compassionate release 
eligibility in 2016 in response to the BOP’s narrow definition and failure to use its discretion to bring 
compassionate release petitions before sentencing courts. Press Release, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, U.S. 
Sentencing Commission Approves Significant Changes to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Apr. 15, 
2016), https://www.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/april-15-2016 [https://perma.cc/DBC5-5EN8]. 
42. Berry, supra note 16, at 853. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 868. For instance, in 2011, the BOP filed only thirty motions for early release. Between 
1992 and 2012, the average number of prisoners who received compassionate release was fewer than 
two dozen per year. HUMAN RTS. WATCH & FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, THE ANSWER 
IS NO: TOO LITTLE COMPASSIONATE RELEASE IN US FEDERAL PRISONS 2 (2012) [hereinafter HUMAN 
RTS. WATCH]. 











“extraordinarily small” number of petitions in relation to the federal prison 
population, and that the number had not grown commensurate with the 
number of federal prisoners.45 Overall, the report found that the BOP’s rigid 
criteria resulted in significantly fewer requests for judicial consideration 
than the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement would allow.46 Other 
bureaucratic deficiencies contributed to the rare exercise of compassionate 
release. In an internal review, the Office of the Inspector General found that 
the BOP did not provide guidance to its staff about the criteria for 
compassionate release, resulting in ad hoc decision-making,47 and failed to 
implement any timeliness standards for review of compassionate release 
petitions.48 It further determined that the BOP’s compassionate release 
program was “poorly managed and implemented inconsistently” and had 
likely resulted in eligible prisoners not being considered for release.49  
In 2018, lawmakers addressed failures in compassionate release in the 
First Step Act,50 remarkably bipartisan legislation designed to reduce the 
federal prison population.51 Proponents of the First Step Act lauded it as a 
success for the movement to end mass incarceration, although some 
critiqued it for failing to fully address systematic issues.52 The First Step 
 
45. HUMAN RTS. WATCH, supra note 44, at 35. 
46. Id. at 2–3, 7, 27. 
47. INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 9, at i. 
48. Id. at ii. 
49. Id. at i; see also Shon Hopwood, Second Looks & Second Chances, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 
105–06 (2019). The BOP responded to the Office of the Inspector General’s report, but only minimally. 
Until 2013, on average, only twenty-four inmates were released each year via compassionate release. 
Following the report, that average increased to eighty-three inmates between August 2013 and 
September 2014. Public Hearing on Compassionate Release and the Conditions of Supervision Before 
the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 63–74 (2016) (statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of 
Just.).  
50. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45558, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: AN OVERVIEW 
(2019). 
51. The New York Times characterized the First Step Act as a push by an “unlikely coalition of 
liberals and conservatives” including “the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Conservative 
Union, the Koch brothers and the liberal Center for American Progress.” Nicholas Fandos, Senate Passes 
Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/ 
politics/senate-criminal-justice-bill.html [https://perma.cc/R4SF-KP5Z]; see also Osita Nwanevu, The 
Improbable Success of a Criminal-Justice-Reform Bill Under Trump, NEW YORKER (Dec. 17, 2018), htt 
ps://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-improbable-success-of-a-criminal-justice-reform-bill-u 
nder-trump [https://perma.cc/M4BA-P36U]. 
52. See, e.g., Zak Cheney-Rice, The First Step Act Deserves Your Skepticism, NEW YORK: 
INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 20, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/first-step-act-skepticism.html 
[https://perma.cc/H2CH-GK7Z]; Natasha Lennard, The First Step Act Is Not Sweeping Criminal Justice 
Reform — and the Risk Is That It Becomes the Only Step, THE INTERCEPT (Dec. 19, 2018, 6:18 AM), htt 
ps://theintercept.com/2018/12/19/first-step-act-criminal-justice-reform-bill/ (“To call the First Step Act 
limited would be an understatement. The legislation could make a crucial material difference to the lives 
of thousands of incarcerated people—something that should not be dismissed—but it would hardly make 
a dent in America’s mass incarceration problem.”) [https://perma.cc/2GTX-MZXY]. For a full 













Act has three main components: correctional reform through the 
establishment of a new assessment system at the BOP; sentencing reform 
related to some federal offenses; and the reauthorization of the Second 
Chance Act.53 In addition to these components, the First Step Act included 
some other criminal justice-related provisions.54 One of these provisions 
sought to increase the use and transparency of compassionate release.55 For 
instance, the First Step Act included new requirements regarding 
notification to petitioners and the creation of annual reports.56 Most 
significantly, the First Step Act authorized inmates to petition sentencing 
courts directly for compassionate release, after exhausting administrative 
remedies.57 Since the First Step Act’s enactment, many more inmates have 
received compassionate release than otherwise would have without the 
reform.58  
II. COMPASSIONATE RELEASE WITHIN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
SCHEME 
A sentencing court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it is 
imposed.59 Compassionate release is an exception to this rule.60 However, 
unlike the other exceptions that relate to procedural rules61 and to generally 
applicable changes in the sentencing guidelines,62 compassionate release 
involves a substantial exercise of discretion. Previously, the judicial 
 
Act Became Law — and What Happens Next, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.bren 
nancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/how-first-step-act-became-law-and-what-happens-next [https 
://perma.cc/3UW9-QGSN]. 
53. JAMES, supra note 50, at 1. 
54. Id. at 1. 
55. Id. at 18. 
56. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(d), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. 
57. Id. § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. at 5239. An inmate gains the authority to directly petition the 
sentencing court in the occurrence of one of two conditions: either the prisoner exhausts “all 
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the [inmate’s] behalf,” or 
thirty days lapse from the BOP’s receipt of the prisoner’s request. Id. The thirty-day exhaustion 
requirement is not jurisdictional and can be waived. United States v. Haney, 454 F. Supp. 3d 316, 319–
22 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Many district courts have waived this requirement because of the “serious and 
imminent harm” posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. United States v. Smith, No. 15-cr-30039, 2020 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 98878, at *12 (C.D. Ill. June 5, 2020) (collecting cases). 
58. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 21. Between December 21, 2018, when the First 
Step Act was signed into law, and July 19, 2020, 124 compassionate release petitions were granted, as 
compared to thirty-four total in 2018. Id. Of the compassionate release petitions that have been granted 
since the Act’s enactment, only around half were granted by the BOP and in the other half the prisoners 
won release from federal courts. Jody Godoy, Courts Bolster Compassionate Release Under First Step, 
LAW360 (July 19, 2019, 4:13 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1180220/courts-bolster-compassio 
nate-release-under-first-step [https://perma.cc/R42J-B29N]. 
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). 
60. Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
61. Id. § 3582(c)(1)(B). 
62. Id. § 3582(c)(2). 











branch’s authority to reduce inmates’ sentences was subject to the BOP’s 
consent.63 Now, the First Step Act empowers the judicial branch to utilize 
its discretion on compassionate release petitions and disempowers the 
executive branch by removing the BOP’s gatekeeping function.64 Legal 
scholars are increasingly recognizing the potentially large import of the 
updated compassionate release mechanism as an avenue for judicial 
“second looks” at sentences.65 
The updated compassionate release mechanism raises the constitutional 
question of whether, under the separation of powers doctrine,66 the judicial 
branch has the authority to reduce, at any time, an inmate’s lawfully 
imposed sentence despite the opposition of the executive branch.67 On the 
one hand, in support of judicial authority, compassionate release resembles 
straightforward judicial modification of a sentence. In United States v. 
Benz,68 the Supreme Court distinguished judicial and executive power over 
sentences and held that a sentencing court may constitutionally modify a 
sentence imposed during the same term: 
We find nothing in the suggestion that the action of the district court 
in reducing the punishment after the prisoner had served a part of the 
imprisonment originally imposed was a usurpation of the pardoning 
power of the executive. The judicial power and the executive power 
over sentences are readily distinguishable. To render judgment is a 
judicial function. To carry the judgment into effect is an executive 
function. To cut short a sentence by an act of clemency is an exercise 
of executive power which abridges the enforcement of the judgment, 
but does not alter it qua judgment. To reduce a sentence by 
amendment alters the terms of the judgment itself and is a judicial act 
as much as the imposition of the sentence in the first instance.69 
 
63. See supra notes 38, 40 and accompanying text. 
64. For a discussion of the historical and separation of power argument regarding compassionate 
release, see Green, supra note 19, at 145.  
65. See infra notes 94–96 and accompanying text; see also Sarah French Russell, Second Looks 
at Sentences Under the First Step Act, 32 FED. SENT’G REP. 76, 78 (2019) (“Although the First Step 
Act’s amendment to § 3582(c)(1)(A) has received little public attention, several commentators have 
stressed its importance.”); Hopwood, supra note 49, at 106–07; Todd Bussert, What the FIRST STEP 
Act Means for Federal Prisoners, THE CHAMPION, May 2019, at 32 (describing the removal of the 
BOP’s gatekeeping function as a “sea change”). 
66. Broadly, separation of powers is the principle that the three branches of government operate 
separately and fulfill different functions. While the legislative branch can grant authority to the other 
two branches as necessary to carry out its legislation, it is constrained by the constitutional division of 
powers. For a historical treatment of the development of the separation of powers doctrine, see M. J. C. 
VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967). 
67. See United States v. Becks, No. 8:18CR81, 2019 WL 3820933, at *1 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 
2019). 
68. 282 U.S. 304 (1931). 












In this case, the Court found that an amendment reducing a sentence was an 
exercise of the judicial function “to render judgment” that in no way 
infringed on the executive function “[t]o carry the judgment into effect.”70 
However, the Court was considering a reduction in the sentence during the 
same term in which the sentence was imposed.71  
In contrast, reduced sentences via the compassionate release mechanism 
do not occur during the same term in which the sentences were imposed. 
Rather, in the vast majority of cases, compassionate release applies to 
inmates years and even decades after the original conviction. The decision 
to grant compassionate release also is based on judgment about the inmate’s 
current circumstances, not judgment about the propriety of the originally 
proposed sentence. The purpose of compassionate release as well as the 
passage of time suggests that compassionate release reductions in sentence 
are more like an exercise of the executive power to “cut short a sentence by 
an act of clemency.”72 
Clemency is a firmly rooted function of the executive branch.73 
Clemency is “a determination late in the criminal justice process by an 
executive authority to mitigate some consequences of a sentence.”74 The 
function of clemency is to recognize the imperfection of the criminal justice 
system as well as the complexity of circumstances surrounding an 
individual criminal actor.75 The pardon power is a form of clemency76 with 
deep historical roots.77 The Constitution provides that “[t]he President . . . 
shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the 
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”78 In the Federalist Papers, 
Alexander Hamilton justified the pardon power as tempering legislative 
determinations of punishment: “The criminal code of every country 
partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to 
exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance 
too sanguinary and cruel.”79  
 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 306. 
72. Id. at 311. 
73. For a discussion of the historical development of the clemency power, see Larkin, supra note 
23, at 5–7. 
74. RONALD L. GOLDFARB & LINDA R. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 316 (1973). 
75. Id. at 317.  
76. Other forms of clemency include commutation, reprieve, and amnesty. Id. at 316. 
77. For a complete discussion of the history of the pardon power, as well as the pardon power’s 
connection to the federal system of parole, see Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon 
Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169 (2010). 
78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147, (1871) (“It 
is the intention of the Constitution that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the government—
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial—shall be, in its sphere, independent of the others. To the 
executive alone is intrusted [sic] the power of pardon; and it is granted without limit.”). 
79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 











Historically, courts have understood the pardon power to encompass the 
power to commute an otherwise valid sentence.80 In Ex parte Wells,81 the 
President commuted a sentence of death to a sentence of life 
imprisonment.82 The Supreme Court found that was a valid exercise of the 
pardon power, grounding its reasoning in the historical use of the pardon 
power to create alternative sentences, thereby reading the pardon power 
broadly as “extending the power to pardon to all kinds of pardons known in 
the law as such, whatever may be their denomination.”83 Thus, the power to 
commute is vested in the same authority as the power to pardon.84 
Commutation decisions are not subject to judicial review,85 though the 
clemency process can trigger due process review by the courts.86 Federal 
courts further may not enjoin the executive to grant a pardon or provide their 
own equitable relief.87 
So, in support of executive authority, compassionate release resembles 
clemency that arises out of the executive pardon power.88 As a “safety 
valve” provision, compassionate release conceptually operates outside of 
the statutory framework that prescribes the proper sentence lengths. By 
design, sentence commutation through a mechanism like compassionate 
release frustrates congressional policy because it counteracts the 
punishment prescribed by the SRA and the Sentencing Commission.89 
Compassionate release is similar to parole90 in that they are both “creature[s] 
of the legislature.”91 Initially, it was within Congress’ prerogative to 
 
80. Lupo v. Zerbst, 92 F.2d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1937) (“The constitutional power to grant reprieves 
and pardons includes the power to grant commutations on lawful conditions.”). 
81. 59 U.S. 307 (1855).  
82. Id. at 317.  
83. Id. at 314. 
84. GOLDFARB & SINGER, supra note 74, at 343–44. 
85. Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (“Unlike probation, pardon 
and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if 
ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review.”). 
86. Daniel T. Kobil, Compelling Mercy: Judicial Review and the Clemency Power, 9 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 698, 701–02 (2012). 
87. Samuel T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 253, 
288 (2010) (citing United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 356 (1928) (finding federal district courts do 
not have inherent authority to grant probation, which would “confer very comprehensive power on the 
district judges in the exercise of what is very like that of executive clemency”)). 
88. For a discussion of “second look” provisions in the federal criminal justice system that traces 
their development from the pardon power, to parole, to compassionate release, see Hopwood, supra note 
49, at 107–09. 
89. See Morison, supra note 87, at 302–03 (“The purpose of the Pardon Clause is precisely to 
function as a limited check on Congress’ legislative authority by empowering the President to alleviate 
the legal consequences of a criminal offense . . . in spite of the existing statutory framework. This remains 
true, by definition, even if such action frustrates congressional policy, which is a calculation committed 
by the Constitution to the President’s political judgment . . . .”). 
90. Parole previously existed in the federal system. 












establish systems of parole and compassionate release.92 In designing those 
systems, though, the legislative branch was essentially codifying a 
traditional function of the executive.93  
Some commentators have espoused this interpretation of the updated 
compassionate release mechanism as a form of clemency. Legal scholar 
Shon Hopwood characterizes the updated compassionate release 
mechanism as a “second look” provisions in the federal justice system,94 
arguing that the First Step Act empowers federal sentencing courts with an 
equitable power to correct fundamentally unfair sentences.95 Margaret 
Love, a former Justice Department Pardon Attorney, advanced a similar 
interpretation of the First Step Act, wherein the “clemency-by-judge” 
compassionate release mechanism is “the hidden, magical trapdoor in the 
First Step Act that has yet to come to everyone’s attention,” which further 
“obviate[s] the need for the clemency process to take care of the great 
majority of commutation cases.”96  
Most courts have implemented the First Step Act without raising this 
constitutional issue, and, to the extent that it has been raised, courts find it 
acceptable in the constitutional scheme. One district court noted briefly that 
the change in law allowing inmates to bring petitions directly is 
“constitutionally suspect,” due to its infringement on the Article II power of 
the executive branch to grant reprieves and pardons.97 Another district court, 
in addressing the constitutionality of the updated compassionate release 
mechanism, construed the First Step Act as granting the judicial branch only 
limited authority to release inmates via compassionate release. The court 
reasoned that judicial action is, notably, cabined by the “intricate sentence-
adjustment scheme” and judicial responsibility to maintain fairness in 
sentencing.98  
 
92. Id. at 198. 
93. Parole, however, like compassionate release, historically derives from the pardon power. The 
modern system of parole evolved from English measures including conditional pardons, indentures, and 
allowing criminals to be transported to British colonies. GOLDFARB & SINGER, supra note 74, at 257. In 
the United States, the adoption of parole was preceded by the use of the conditional pardon and reduction 
in sentences for “good time” by state governors. Id. at 262. The paroling authority was exercised by the 
governor, or by administrative boards developed to make decisions related to parole. Id. at 264. 
94. Hopwood, supra note 49, at 107–09. 
95. Id. at 102–03. 
96. RJ Vogt, How Courts Could Ease the White House's Clemency Backlog, LAW360 (Aug. 25, 
2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1191991/how-courts-could-ease-the-white-house-s-
clemency-backlog [https://perma.cc/7YVQ-C5BR]. But see Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Future of 
Presidential Clemency Decision-Making, 16 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 399, 418 (2020) [hereinafter Larkin, 
The Future of Presidential Clemency Decision-Making] (finding that the statutory text and congressional 
intent foreclose interpreting the updated compassionate release mechanism as a broad remedial 
resentencing statute). 
97. United States v. Becks, No. 8:18CR81, 2019 WL 3820933, at *1 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2019). 
98. United States v. Brown, 411 F. Supp. 3d 446, 451 (S.D. Iowa 2019). 











A brief review of the analytic frameworks of formalism and 
functionalism sheds light on the general lack of discussion of the 
constitutional issue in case law. Formalism “relies on strict textual 
interpretation and a belief in the determinacy of constitutional language.”99 
Thus, formalists advocate for the strict enforcement of separation of powers 
principles based on the text of the Constitution. Functionalism, on the other 
hand, deemphasizes the strict separation of the branches in favor of the 
principle of checks and balances in a system of overlapping power.100 While 
this division into two categories of analysis oversimplifies the separation of 
powers jurisprudence, the two terms convey summarily the two primary 
approaches to separation of powers questions.101  
From a formalistic approach, compassionate release is best understood 
as a subset of the commutation power, which is in turn a subset of the pardon 
power. Compassionate release, like the other mechanisms falling under the 
pardon power, is an exercise of the politically accountable executive branch 
that tempers the legislatively proscribed and judicially determined 
punishment. Historically and conceptually, then, under a strict separation of 
powers doctrine, compassionate release should best be kept as an executive 
prerogative.  
From a functionalist approach, however, the statutory scheme likely 
provides adequate checks and balances to allow some overlapping power in 
regard to compassionate release. From this view, judicial authority to 
modify sentences and executive authority to commute sentences can coexist 
in the realm of compassionate release as a legitimate legislative solution.102 
This approach is bolstered by the practical realities of compassionate 
release. The updated mechanism empowering the judicial branch arose only 
out of the executive branch’s near abdication of responsibility for 
implementing compassionate release as legislatively designed.103 Further, 
compassionate release affects only a small number of federal inmates,104 and 
it serves compelling social and moral purposes.105  
 
99. Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of Congress, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 584 (1991). 
100. Id. at 585. 
101. The Supreme Court has oscillated between both methods of analysis and applied both to 
questions on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 585–89.  
102. Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial Sentence 
Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465, 526 (2010). 
103. See supra notes 40–49 and accompanying text. 
104. See supra note 58. 












III. REPRESENTATION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE PETITIONS  
Following a functionalist approach and taking the updated 
compassionate release mechanism as constitutional, the next question 
becomes one of policy. Namely, whether allowing inmates to petition 
sentencing courts directly is the best implementation of compassionate 
release. By allowing an inmate to petition a sentencing court directly for 
compassionate release, the First Step Act created an adversarial process for 
compassionate release where none existed before: on one side, the 
petitioning inmate, and on the other, the DOJ defending the BOP’s 
administrative denial of the petition. This new form of compassionate 
release petitioning raises questions of legal representation and equity among 
inmates. 
As an initial matter, there is no right to counsel for inmates petitioning 
for compassionate relief within the immediate statutory scheme. The First 
Step Act’s modification of the compassionate release provision does 
contemplate the assistance of counsel for inmates seeking judicial review. 
For instance, under the added notification requirements, the First Step Act 
requires the BOP to notify, in addition to the inmate’s family members, the 
“defendant’s attorney.”106 The modified statute also anticipates motions 
filed by the defendant’s attorney.107 However, the statute does not provide 
a right to appointed counsel. 
A comparison to an adjacent statutory provision is illuminating. 
Compassionate release is one of two exceptions to the rule that sentencing 
courts may not modify lawfully imposed sentences.108 Sentencing courts 
may also reduce an inmate’s sentence when there is a change in the 
sentencing guidelines.109 Both of these exceptions are located in the same 
place in the statutory scheme. They have similar requirements as to what 
the court must consider before exercising its discretion in reducing a 
sentence.110 Under both these provisions, an inmate can directly petition the 
court for a sentence reduction.111 For the second exception, the courts have 
uniformly found that there is no constitutional right to counsel after a 
 
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(d)(2) (requiring notification of the defendant’s attorney “in the case of a 
defendant diagnosed with a terminal illness” and “in the case of a defendant who is physically or 
mentally unable to submit a request for a sentence reduction”). 
107. Id. § 3582(d)(3)(K). 
108. Compassionate release is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). 
109. Id. § 3582(c)(2); see also supra text accompanying notes 32–35. 
110. For both exceptions, courts must consider the sentencing factors set forth in 3553(a) and any 
applicable policy statements by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582. 
111. Id. 











defendant’s direct appeal has closed.112 Courts have also determined that an 
inmate has no statutory right to counsel when petitioning due to a change in 
the sentencing guidelines.113  
Turning to other potential sources of the right to counsel, first, the Sixth 
Amendment of the Constitution does not provide a right to counsel for 
compassionate release petitioners. The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”114 In the landmark decision Gideon 
v. Wainwright,115 the Supreme Court held that all criminal defendants facing 
serious charges are entitled to representation, regardless of ability to afford 
an attorney.116 The Sixth Amendment guarantee attaches only to “critical 
stages” of a criminal proceeding,117 when the presence of counsel is 
“necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected 
by his right . . . to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.”118 
Courts have generally found that post-trial motions to reduce a sentence are 
not critical stages of the prosecution such that the Sixth Amendment would 
apply.119  
Arguably, the compassionate release petition is a critical stage of a 
criminal case where the constitutional right to counsel should apply.120 The 
Supreme Court has extended the right to counsel to some post-sentencing 
 
112. United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The notion of a statutory or 
constitutional right to counsel for § 3582(c)(2) motions has been rejected by all of our sister circuits that 
have addressed the issue, and we agree with this consensus.” (citing United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 
724, 730 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Tidwell, 178 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Townsend, 98 F.3d 510, 512–13 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007, 1010–11 
(5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Reddick, 53 F.3d 462, 464–65 (2d Cir. 1995))); see also United States 
v. Brown, 565 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Brown, 556 F.3d 1108, 1113 (10th Cir. 
2009). 
113. See, e.g., United States v. Forman, 553 F.3d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 2009); Legree, 205 F.3d at 
730; Townsend, 98 F.3d at 512–13; Whitebird, 55 F.3d at 1011; Reddick, 53 F.3d at 463–65. 
114. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
115. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
116. Id. at 334. 
117. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (“In recognition of [the] realities of modern 
criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to ‘critical’ 
stages of the proceedings.”). 
118. Meredith B. Halama, Note, Loss of A Fundamental Right: The Sixth Amendment as a Mere 
“Prophylactic Rule”, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1211 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 
227). 
119. United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[A]s a general matter that there 
is no right to a hearing and assistance of counsel on a motion for reduction of sentence.” (citing United 
States v. Tidwell, 178 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007, 1011 
(5th Cir. 1995))); see also Patrick v. State, 108 P.3d 838, 844 (Wyo. 2005) (“A motion for sentence 
reduction is by its very definition a motion seeking post-conviction relief.”). 
120. United States v. Robinson, 542 F.3d 1045, 1052 (5th Cir. 2008) (revisiting the question of 
whether a § 3582(c) motion triggers either a statutory or constitutional right to an attorney given “new 












proceedings related to the underlying judgment.121 Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence shows that the effective assistance of counsel is crucial in 
providing a defendant the right to be heard.122 Allowing inmates to petition 
sentencing courts directly provides, in theory, a right for their cases to be 
heard. Without counsel, the right to petition may be elusive, especially for 
inmates with mental or physical handicaps.123 Unlike motions based on 
subsequent changes to sentencing guidelines, compassionate release 
petitions involve complex factual allegations and supporting 
documentation. Appointed counsel would serve a well-functioning 
adversary system by lessening the imbalance between the petitioner and the 
government.124 However, it is unlikely the constitutional guarantee of 
counsel extends to post-conviction compassionate release proceedings. 
The next potential source of Ca right to counsel is in the Criminal Justice 
Act (CJA).125 Prior to the CJA’s passage, judicial decisions had been 
gradually expanding the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.126 
The CJA resulted from the growing recognition that providing a meaningful 
right to counsel for criminal defendants required dedicated resources.127 The 
CJA created a robust system of federally funded public defense of criminal 
defendants.128 Currently, there are eighty-one federal defense organizations, 
serving ninety-one out of ninety-four federal judicial districts.129 In 2013, 
 
121. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135–36 (1967) (holding the right to counsel extended to the 
imposition of a new sentence during a parole revocation proceeding).  
122. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (“The right to be heard would be, 
in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”).  
123. See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 607 (2005) (“Persons in [the defendant’s] 
situation, many of whom have little education, learning disabilities, and mental impairments, are 
particularly handicapped as self-representatives.”).  
124. Michael C. Mims, A Trap for the Unwary: The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel After 
Montejo v. Louisiana, 71 LA. L. REV. 345, 348 n.11 (2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 685 (1984) (“The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it 
envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just 
results.”)). 
125. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 3006A). 
126. See Johnston v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (holding counsel must be appointed for federal 
criminal defendants); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (extending the right to appointed counsel 
to state capital prosecutions); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states); see also Paul D. 
Hazlehurst, A Federal Public Defender’s Perspective, 62 FED. LAW. 50, 52 (2015) (describing judicial 
developments expanding the right to counsel). 
127. Hazlehurst, supra note 126, at 52. 
128. A 1970 amendment to the CJA authorized districts to establish defender organizations. 
Defender Services, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/defender-services [https://p 
erma.cc/EHG9-4NP3]. The CJA authorized two types of offices: federal public defender organizations 
are staffed by salaried federal employees, while community defender organizations are nonprofits 
governed by a board of directors. Both types of offices receive funding from the federal judiciary. 
Hazlehurst, supra note 126, at 52. 
129. Defender Services, supra note 128. 











the federal defense system provided representation for over 230,000 
defendants.130 
The CJA provides that “[a] person for whom counsel is appointed shall 
be represented at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance 
before the United States magistrate judge or the court through appeal, 
including ancillary matters appropriate to the proceedings.”131 Arguably, 
under the CJA, a post-conviction reduction in sentence constitutes an 
“ancillary matter,” and inmates are thus entitled to counsel for their 
petitions.132 However, the federal judiciary has defined “ancillary matters” 
narrowly to proceedings that are closely related to the principal criminal 
charge.133 Guidelines on administering the CJA suggest that a petition for 
compassionate release is not covered by the term “ancillary matters.”134 To 
be ancillary, the matter must have “arose from” the same facts and 
circumstances as the original charge.135 The scope of representation in an 
ancillary matter should extend only to the part related to the “principal 
criminal charge.”136 Finally, representation in an ancillary matter is only 
compensable as part of the representation in the principal case for which 
counsel has been appointed; it is not considered a separate appointment.137 
Generally, appellate courts have held that “ancillary matters” refers to 
matters involved in “‘defending the principal criminal charge,’ and not to 
post-conviction proceedings.”138 
Considered under this judicial interpretation, compassionate release 
petitions cannot be construed as ancillary matters. Compassionate release 
petitions require a showing that a prisoner’s circumstances meet the 
statutory criteria of “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances meriting 
compassionate release.139 As such, these petitions necessarily involve a 
different set of facts and different legal issues than those underlying the 
principal criminal charge. In some cases, compassionate release petitions 
 
130. Criminal Justice Act: At 50 Years, a Landmark in the Right to Counsel, U.S. COURTS (Aug. 
20, 2014), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2014/08/20/criminal-justice-act-50-years-landmark-right-co 
unsel [https://perma.cc/9VY9-Y5KF]. Nationwide, federal defenders receive sixty percent of CJA 
appointments, while the remaining forty percent are handled by CJA panel attorneys, court-appointed 
private lawyers who handle the cases for an hourly fee. Defender Services, supra note 128. 
131. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c). 
132. See, e.g., United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1995). 
133. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., 7 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY: DEFENDER SERVICES 
§ 210.20.30(b) (2019) [hereinafter GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/defaul 
t/files/vol_07.pdf [https://perma.cc/U97X-BV2Z].  
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id.  
137. Id.  
138. United States v. Reddick, 53 F.3d 462, 464 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding the right to counsel 
“extends only through the defendant’s first appeal” (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755–
57 (1991))). 












may be brought by the same defender who was appointed to represent the 
prisoner in the principal criminal charge, for instance, when the qualifying 
circumstances arise within one or two years of the original conviction. 
However, in many—if not most—cases, the qualifying circumstances for 
compassionate release will arise many years or even decades after the 
original conviction. In those cases, representation by a defender will require 
a separate appointment, which alone disqualifies the compassionate release 
petition from being an ancillary matter.140 
While there is likely no right to appointed counsel for compassionate 
release petitions,141 petitioning inmates may have recourse available by 
appealing to judicial discretion. District courts have some discretion to 
appoint counsel in post-conviction proceedings.142 In relation to 
compassionate release cases, some district courts have appointed federal 
defenders to determine whether indigent inmates may qualify for relief 
under the First Step Act and then to assist in filing motions for that relief.143 
However, a district court’s discretionary appointment of publicly funded 
counsel for compassionate release petitions rests on uncertain legal grounds. 
 
140. GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, supra note 133, § 210.20.30(e). 
141. See United States v. Wilson, No. 5:08-CR-50051-KES, 2019 WL 7372975, at *3 (D.S.D. 
Dec. 31, 2019) (holding an inmate does not have a right to counsel under the Constitution or the CJA 
for a compassionate release petition under § 3582(c)(1)(A)) (citing United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 
789, 793–95 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding no right to counsel for a petition under § 3582(c)(2))). 
142. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 567, 569–70 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding there is 
no right to counsel in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, and that the decision whether to appoint counsel is left 
to the district court's discretion); Reddick, 53 F.3d at 465 (noting appointment of counsel should be a 
matter of discretion for the district courts, depending on the apparent merits of the motion). 
143. For instance, the District of Maryland has a standing order appointing the Office of the 
Federal Public Defender to “represent any defendant previously determined to have been entitled to 
appointment of counsel or who is now indigent to determine whether the defendant is eligible to petition 
the Court for compassionate release in accordance with Section 603(b) of the First Step Act of 2018 and 
to file any motions for compassionate release.” District of Maryland, Order 2019-04, In Re: Section 
603(b), First Step Act of 2018, https://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/sites/mdd/files/2019-04.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/G3B8-NN4M]. The District of Kansas has a similar standing order appointing counsel for “any 
defendant previously determined to have been entitled to appointment of counsel, or who is now 
indigent, to determine whether that defendant may qualify to seek compassionate release . . . based on 
medical condition or age.” District of Kansas, Order 19-1, In Re: First Step Act of 2018, https://www.ksd 
.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/19-1-FSA-Compassionate-Release-Order.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/HP5M-VU2A]. The Western District of Washington has a standing order appointing counsel to 
“represent for screening purposes any defendant previously determined to have been entitled to 
appointment of counsel and any defendant who is now indigent, to determine whether that defendant 
may qualify for relief under Sections 102(b) and/or 603 of the First Step Act, and to present any petitions, 
motions, or applications relating thereto to the Court for disposition.” Western District of Washington, 
Order 03-19, In Re: Motions for Sentence Reduction Pursuant to Section 404 of the 2018 First Step Act, 
https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/sites/wawd/files/GO%20in%20re%20motions%20for%20sentence%2
0reduction%20compassionate%20release.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y39B-RK3A]. Similarly, the Eastern 
District of North Carolina appoints counsel to any eligible defendant “to determine whether that 
defendant may qualify for relief pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, and if so, to assist the defendant 
in obtaining such relief.” Eastern District of North Carolina, Order 19-SO-3, In Re: First Step Act of 
2018, https://www.nced.uscourts.gov/data/StandingOrders/19-SO-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DM3-ZLY 
N]. 











Courts do not have “inherent power” to appoint counsel at public expense 
when not authorized by the constitution or by statute.144 In a case about a 
reduction in sentence due to a change in sentencing guidelines, the Seventh 
Circuit rejected a request to appoint counsel. The court cited the 
Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”145 The 
court reasoned that the CJA only authorizes appointment of counsel at 
public expense pursuant to Sixth Amendment requirements, or pursuant to 
certain other provisions, not including a motion to reduce a prisoner’s 
sentence.146 Analogously, motions for reductions in sentences based on 
compassionate release may be similarly inappropriate for the appointment 
of counsel.  
Relying on discretionary appointment of counsel in compassionate 
release petitions raises policy concerns. The fundamental concern 
underlying the right to counsel is one of fairness: it would be unfair for 
criminal defendants with resources to be represented by counsel, while 
indigent defendants were not.147 Similar unfairness arises in the 
compassionate release context, where some inmates may afford private 
counsel, while indigent inmates may not. Providing appointed counsel may 
alleviate this unfairness for some. However, allowing such discretionary 
grants would introduce new unfairness among compassionate release 
petitioners, wherein an inmate’s right to counsel for a compassionate release 
petition depends upon the district in which the inmate is located.  
IV. PROPOSAL  
Compassionate release poses two thematic questions. First, who will 
define the circumstances that are “extraordinary and compelling”? Second, 
who will apply that definition to individual cases? This Note proposes, in 
regard to the first, that the authority remain with the Sentencing 
Commission. This Note proposes, in regard to the second, a divide in 
authority, where the sentencing courts make the final decision to reduce a 
sentence, but an independent executive body identifies and supports inmates 
in filing compassionate release petitions.  
Looking to the first question, who will define the standard for 
compassionate release, the Sentencing Commission remains the best body. 
The initial legislation creating compassionate release tasked the Sentencing 
 
144. United States v. Foster, 706 F.3d 887, 888 (7th Cir. 2013). 
145. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7). 
146. Id.  
147. Halama, supra note 118, at 1209 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168 (1985) (“The 
right to the assistance of counsel . . . is indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system 












Commission with developing policy guidance for how compassionate 
release should be implemented.148 The Sentencing Commission is a 
bipartisan, independent agency located within the judicial branch, with 
wide-ranging statutory duties, including promulgating sentencing 
guidelines, collecting and analyzing data, and conducting research on 
sentencing issues.149 Because of its independent status, coordinating role 
between all three branches of government and the actors in the federal 
criminal justice system, and resources for data collection and analysis, the 
Sentencing Commission is well-positioned to guide compassionate release 
policy.150 
Currently, there is a problem with the Sentencing Commission’s role in 
the compassionate release process. The First Step Act directs that judicial 
action must be “consistent with applicable policy statements” from the 
Sentencing Commission.151 However, the Sentencing Commission has not 
promulgated an updated policy statement since the First Step was 
enacted.152 The outdated policy statement still indicates that compassionate 
release may only be granted upon the BOP’s motion.153  
This outdated policy statement has created live questions in district 
courts. First, there is a question over whether the policy statement should be 
considered at all when deciding compassionate release petitions. A majority 
of district courts have found that the failure to update the policy means that 
there is no “applicable” Sentencing Commission policy to apply under the 
First Step Act.154 These courts reason that in light of the congressional intent 
to increase the use and transparency of compassionate release, the First Step 
Act necessarily provides district court judges leave to depart from previous 
practice and consider all circumstances that may constitute “extraordinary 
and compelling.”155 Several circuit courts have sided with this majority 
position that district court judges have discretion to define “extraordinary 
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and compelling” at their own initiative.156 But a minority of district courts 
maintain that the outdated policy still applies to curtail judicial discretion.157  
Second, there is a question whether the district court judge may stand in 
the place of the BOP to determine what falls under the policy’s residual 
clause of “other [extraordinary and compelling] reason[s].”158 Some courts 
have asserted their authority to determine reasons outside of those 
enumerated by the Sentencing Commission.159 Other courts have refrained 
from doing so, thereby limiting successful compassionate release petitions 
to those based on serious medical condition or terminal illness, the types of 
petitions that were most frequently approved by the BOP in the past.160 The 
confusion in lower courts has contributed to inconsistent outcomes across 
districts.161 
Such questions would be easily resolved by the Sentencing Commission 
promulgating a new policy statement on compassionate release. However, 
the Sentencing Commission cannot currently act because it has only one 
voting commissioner,162 and amending a policy guideline requires four 
voting commissioners.163 The Sentencing Commission’s seven voting 
members must be appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
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Senate.164 Therefore, as an initial matter, the Biden administration must 
appoint and confirm at least three commissioners such that the Sentencing 
Commission may fulfill its statutory duty to provide policy guidance on 
compassionate release. The Sentencing Commission then should harmonize 
its policy guidelines with the First Step Act to reflect both the updated 
mechanism and the policy goal to increase the use of compassionate release. 
Updating the policy guideline will reduce confusion among district courts 
and promote uniform outcomes across jurisdictions. 
The second question—of who will apply the “extraordinary and 
compelling” standard to individual compassionate release petitions—is 
more difficult to answer. In the initial framing of compassionate release, 
that authority was in practice granted to the BOP because of its gatekeeping 
role.165 A myriad of problems with the BOP’s exercise of that authority 
resulted in compassionate release being rarely used.166 The First Step Act 
sought to remedy the issues caused by the BOP’s gatekeeping role by 
allowing inmates to circumvent the BOP’s denial of their petitions and bring 
the petitions directly to sentencing courts.167 However, this solution by the 
First Step Act has drawbacks. By allowing inmates to petition sentencing 
courts directly, the First Step Act has created the potential for adversarial 
contests between petitioning inmates and the government. As discussed in 
Parts II and III, the new adversarial process raises conceptual and practical 
concerns.168  
There are strong historical, policy, and separation of powers arguments 
in favor of vesting gatekeeping control over compassionate release in the 
executive branch.169 Historically, legal scholars have been concerned that 
judicial involvement with discretionary and political questions could 
undermine the integrity of the legal system.170 The “extralegal, 
discretionary, and political” decision-making involved in modifying a valid 
conviction and sentence is a task for the politically accountable branch, not 
for the judiciary that initially imposed the sentence.171 Keeping the initial 
decision in the executive branch would ensure that the decision whether to 
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extend compassionate release is attuned to public opinion by keeping it in 
the politically accountable executive branch, not the counter-majoritarian 
judicial branch.172 Locating the discretion in the executive branch would 
also reduce the number adversarial contests over compassionate release 
petitions in sentencing courts and ameliorate the fairness concerns regarding 
petitioning inmates not represented by counsel.  
While keeping initial compassionate release decisions in the executive 
branch is desirable, there are reasons against keeping the discretion within 
the BOP. The BOP’s demonstrated failure to execute the compassionate 
release program arises from conflicting interests. The mission of the BOP 
is “to protect society by confining offenders.”173 The BOP is further subject 
to the prosecutorial interests of the DOJ,174 including interests in longer 
sentences, mandatory punishments, and fewer routine grants of clemency.175 
The DOJ’s dominant mandate is that of law enforcement and obtaining 
convictions; when conflicts arise with other functions, such as clemency, 
the law enforcement interests prevail.176 Basically, there is a conflict of 
interest when the same agency responsible for prosecuting individuals is the 
same agency that controls the granting of clemency.177 
This Note proposes vesting the gatekeeping aspect of compassionate 
release in an executive body that is insulated from the BOP’s and DOJ’s 
conflicting interests, specifically, in a revitalized version of the Parole 
Commission.178 Despite the abolishment of parole in the federal system as 
part of the SRA, the Parole Commission still exists—it oversees the release 
of inmates sentenced prior to the abolishment of parole and sanctions 
violations by the same population.179 Compassionate release resembles 
parole in that they are both release mechanisms deriving authority from the 
pardon power.180 Indeed, many commentators have noted that reforms in the 
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First Step Act have created a new system of “parole light.”181 Administrators 
of parole faced similar challenges that administrators of compassionate 
release will face:182 considering the proper degree of independence from the 
BOP and DOJ, the proper influence of public opinion, and the danger of 
recidivism.183  
Empowering the Parole Commission (perhaps under a different name) to 
identify qualifying petitioners and advocate on their behalf would give a 
voice to all qualifying inmates, regardless of assistance from counsel. An 
executive body free from the conflicting interests of the BOP and DOJ 
would support a greater number of compassionate release petitions. 
Government support of more compassionate release petitions would limit 
the number of petitions subject to adversarial contests in sentencing courts. 
It would also provide government legal or professional staff to prepare the 
compassionate release petitions to appear before sentencing courts. There 
are massive legal and bureaucratic barriers to receiving compassionate 
release, and prisoners bear the burden of proof in presenting their 
petitions.184 An adversarial procedure compounds the underlying civil rights 
crisis of massive race disproportionality.185 An executive body is more 
capable than the judiciary of responding quickly and zealously to the policy 
mandate of increasing the use of compassionate release. 
Even with an executive branch body filling a gatekeeping role, 
sentencing courts will still play a role in compassionate release. Under the 
First Step Act, a sentencing court may reduce the term of imprisonment only 
if three conditions are met: (1) extraordinary and compelling circumstances 
warrant the reduction; (2) the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any 
other person or the community; and (3) the reduction is consistent with the 
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policy statement.186 A court’s authority to grant compassionate release is 
discretionary. Even if extraordinary and compelling circumstances are 
present, the court may decline to grant compassionate release based on the 
3553(a) sentencing factors.187  
CONCLUSION 
Compassionate release, both in theory and in practice, is capable of 
providing for a reduction in sentence and release for only a small proportion 
of federal inmates.188 For that reason, it is not an appropriate or effective 
mechanism for addressing the reality of mass incarceration or mass 
incarceration’s rippling effects. Nonetheless, compassionate release is a 
mechanism that our government should strive to perfect. For the inmates 
who are terminally ill, who are suffering the infirmities of the aging process, 
or who are experiencing crisis in another area of their lives, a functioning 
compassionate release mechanism can make all the difference. For Steve 
and Marie, had compassionate release reform come a little sooner, it would 
have made the difference between Steve dying in prison and dying at 
home.189 The COVID-19 pandemic only underscores the necessity of a 
functioning compassionate release system.190 The virus has rapidly spread 
through federal prisons where social distancing is next to impossible, 
putting prisoners who are elderly or have underlying medical conditions 
especially at risk.191 Beyond the inmates and their families who are provided 
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relief via compassionate release, freeing elderly and ill prisoners is an 
effective way to affirm human dignity and morality.192 Aging prisoners 
suffer in prison in a myriad of ways, including psychological and physical 
abuse, neglect, and social isolation.193  
The First Step Act addressed a problem in the compassionate release 
process: the gatekeeping role of the BOP. As a result, a greater number of 
compassionate release petitions are being granted than were previously.194 
Allowing inmates to petition sentencing courts directly, however, raises 
new concerns over whether that is the best arrangement within the system 
of checks and balances in the federal system, and whether that is the best 
arrangement for providing the most just outcomes for similarly situated 
inmates. Resolving the confusion over the Sentencing Commission’s 
compassionate release guidelines and promulgating new guidelines that 
reflect the policy goals of the First Step Act will contribute substantially to 
fully implementing the reform of compassionate release. An independent 
executive branch body, insulated from the DOJ’s prosecutorial and the 
BOP’s correctional functions, will improve the evaluation of compassionate 
release petitions and increase governmental support and assistance to 
qualifying petitioners. Developing this body will keep compassionate 
release a politically accountable mechanism and contribute to giving all 
inmates fair review and promotion of their circumstances, regardless of their 
ability to hire private counsel. 
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